US Copyright Law

"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." - US Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, also known as the Intellectual Property Clause, which also gives Congress the power to enact statutes.

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The Copyright Act of 1790 secured an author the exclusive right to publish and vend "maps, charts and books" for a term of
14 years, with the right of renewal for one additional 14 year term if the author was still alive.

The Copyright Act of 1790 did not regulate other kinds of writings, such as musical compositions or newspapers.

The Copyright Act of 1790 did not prohibit copying the works of foreign authors.

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The Copyright Act of 1976, is currently the basis of copyright law in the United States governing the legally enforceable rights of creative and artistic works.

The copyright term within the United States was extended by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act which made the copyright term (for works created after 1977) the life of the author plus 70 years, or 95 years for a work of corporate authorship.

When challenged in court in Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003), the Supreme Court agreed that the length of the copyright term could be extended by Congress after the original act of creation and beginning of the copyright term, as long as the extension itself was limited instead of perpetual.

Important laws that impacted U.S. copyrights:

Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 - established copyrights of U.S. works in Berne Convention countries

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) of 1994 - restored U.S. copyright for certain foreign works

Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 - extended terms to 95/120 years or life plus 70 years

Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 - criminalized some cases of copyright infringement

Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 - criminalized more cases of copyright infringement, permitted technology to
"sanitize" works

Statutory provisions relating to copyright currently in effect are codified in Title 17 of the United States Code.

Important international agreements affecting U.S. copyright law include:

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

The United States became a Berne Convention signatory in 1988, and the treaty entered into force with respect to the U.S. on
March 1, 1989. The U.S. is also a party to TRIPS, which itself requires compliance with Berne provisions, and is enforceable
under the WTO dispute resolution process. To meet the treaty requirements, protections were extended to architecture (where
previously only building plans were protected from copying, not buildings, though currently the law makes exception for
reproduction of buildings in photographs or paintings if they are ordinarily visible from a public place), and certain moral rights
of visual artists.

Copyright protection was earlier provided by a dual system under both federal and state laws. Federal law provided "statutory
copyright" and the laws of each state provided "common-law copyright," even though many states have statutes governing
copyright.

We could say that the old "statutory copyright" protected works that were registered and the old "common-law copyright"
protected works that were not.

In 1976, Congress abolished all state copyright laws by declaring a complete federal preemption of state laws. The federal
preemption provision is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 301(a), which states, in relevant parts:

"On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright ... in works of authorship that ... come within the subject matter of copyright ... are governed exclusively by
this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or
statutes of any State."

The preemption is complete in all aspects of copyright protection. State law cannot provide protection for a work that federal
law does not protect.

The preemption covers protection so that a work that falls generally within the subject matter of copyright (such as, a writing)
must either qualify to be protected under federal law, or it cannot be protected at all.

The preemption covers enforcement too. A person accused of copyright infringement cannot be prosecuted in state courts.

The preemption clause only applies to works that are covered by the Copyright Act. That is works that have "not been fixed in
any tangible medium of expression are not covered."

Other examples include choreography that has never been filmed or notated, an impromptu or spontaneous speech, original
works of authorship communicated solely through conversations or live broadcasts, a dramatic sketch or musical composition
improvised or developed from memory and without being recorded or written down.

Scope of copyright law

The purpose of copyright law is to stimulate the creation of as many works of art, literature, music, and other "works
authorship" as possible, in order to benefit the public. The United States recognizes no absolute, natural right in an author to
prevent others from copying or otherwise exploiting his work. The copyright laws give authors limited property rights in their
works, but for the ultimate purpose of benefiting the public by encouraging the creation and dissemination of more works. The
author's interest is secondary to that of the public.

Copyright law tries to:

Copyright law limits property rights to the author's particular method of expressing an idea or information.

Copyright never gives rights in the idea being expressed, or in facts or other elements of the public domain which an author
may incorporate into his work.

Others are free to express the same idea as the author did, or use the same facts, as long as they do not copy the author's
original way of expressing the ideas or facts.

The rights granted in the author's expression are again limited in duration and are subject to certain exceptions permitting public
use under limited circumstances.

Copyright law includes the following types of works

"idea" and "expression"

An important limitation on the scope of copyright protection is the idea/expression dichotomy: While copyright law protects the
expression of an idea, it does not protect the idea itself.

The distinction between "idea" and "expression" is a fundamental part of U.S. law. From the 1976 Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §
102):

In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.

The first amendment provides that "Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of speech." The idea/expression
dichotomy discharges copyright's first amendment duties because the application of copyright protection to expressions, but
not to ideas, serves to prohibit only speech that is constitutionally valueless.

Idea-Expression Dichotomy is embodied in Section 102(b) of the copyright code. It denies protection to the ideas which
underlie copyrightable works. Only the original "expressions" contained in these works can actually receive copyright
protection.

Intellectual property laws are generally designed to protect the fixed expression of an idea rather than the fundamental idea
itself.

Copyright may not subsist in the idea of a man on an expedition, but may subsist in a book which follows that expedition.
Similarly, if the methods or processes described in a technical non-fiction work are patentable they may be the subject of
various patent claims, whereas the fundamental underlying idea may not be. An adventure novel provides an illustration of the
concept. Copyright may subsist in the work as a whole, in the particular story or characters involved, or in any artwork
contained in the book, but generally not in the idea or genre of the story.

The idea-expression divide which is also referred to as idea-expression dichotomy is a concept which explains the appropriate
function of intellectual property laws, which are generally designed to protect the fixed expression or manifestation of an idea
rather than the fundamental idea itself.

Some of the criticism directed at "intellectual property" is incorrectly based on the notion that intellectual property laws confer
proprietary rights in relation to general ideas and concepts per se. The concept originated in copyright law.

Justice Hand once stated that illicit copying need not be word for word "else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial
variations." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).

"Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the
idea--not the idea itself.". Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)

"the person who has clothed the idea in form, whether by means of a picture, a play or a book" owns the copyright. Donoghue
v. Allied Newspapers Limited (1938)

Copyright may not subsist in the idea of a man venturing out on a voyage, but may subsist in a particular story which follows.

"Reporting a person's fall from a bus: the first person to do so could not use the law of copyright to stop other people from
announcing this fact." Latham CJ. in Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds Company Limited v. Taylor (1937).

There are particular ideas that can be expressed intelligibly only in one or a limited number of ways. Therefore even the
expression in these circumstances is unprotected, or extremely limited to verbatim copying only. In the United States this is
known as the merger doctrine, because the expression is considered to be inextricably merged with the idea.

A paper describing a theory, for example, is copyrightable; it may not be reproduced by anyone else without the author's
permission. But the theory itself, which is an idea rather than a specific expression, is not copyrightable. Another author is free
to describe the same theory in his or her own words without violating copyright law.

Compilations and the sweat of the brow doctrine

§ 103 of the Copyright Act allows for the protection of "compilations," provided there is a "creative" or "original" act involved
in such a compilation, such as in the selection (deciding which things to include or exclude), and arrangement (how they are
shown and in what order). The protection is limited only to the selection and arrangement, not to the facts themselves, which
may be freely copied.

Facts are considered synonymous to "ideas" or "discoveries" under this law and are not copyrightable. By extension, a
compilation of uncopyrightable facts is also uncopyrightable.

The Supreme Court decision in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service (1991) further made clear the requirements that
a compilation be original in its composition, in denying protection to telephone "white pages".

The Feist court rejected what was known as the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, in ruling that no matter how much work was
necessary to create a compilation, a non-selective collection of facts ordered in a non-creative way is not subject to copyright
protection.

Authorship

Under § 201, work done "for hire", specifically at the direction of an employer who pays for the work, is, by default, the
property of the employer. That is, if a company hires a writer to write something specific, the company, not the writer, is
considered the "author" of that work and owns the copyrights.

The writer owns other work done by him on his own without compensation and without using company resources.

The author of a work is the initial owner of the copyright in it. Authors may exploit their work themselves or transfer some or
all the rights conferred by the copyright to others. The author is the person who conceives of the copyrightable expression and
fixes it or causes it to be fixed in a tangible form.

"Works made for hire" are an important exception of this rule: When a work is "made for hire", within the meaning of the
Copyright Act, the employer or commissioning party, who pays for creation of the work, is deemed the author, rather than the
employee or commissioned party who actually conceives and fixes the expression.

Ownership of copyright in joint works:

The authors of "joint works" are co-owners of a single copyright in the work. Copyright Act §101 defines a joint work as "a
work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or independent
parts of a unitary whole."

Works for hire:

If a work is made "for hire" within the meaning of the Copyright Act, the employer or commissioning party, who paid for the
work and took the economic risk of it, is deemed the author for copyright purposes and is the initial owner of the copyright.
Copyright Act §101 sets forth the two circumstances under which a work may be found to be a work for hire.

a) Work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment.

In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the term "employee" in
this context should be interpreted according to common law agency principles. If the person doing the work is an "employee"
within the meaning of the common law, and the work was done within the scope of his employment, that is,

then the work is a work for hire and the employer is the initial owner of the copyright, rather than the employee who actually
conceived and fixed the expression.

b) Specially ordered or commissioned works:

Works created by independent contractors (rather than employees) can be deemed works for hire only if two conditions are
satisfied:

the work must fit into one of nine categories of works enumerated in Copyright Act §101.

the parties must expresly agree in a written, signed instrument that the work will be considered a work made for hire.

Ownership of copyright in collective works:

a collective work is a collection of independent, separately copyrightable works of authorship, such as a newspaper, magazine,
or encyclopedia.

In the absence of an express assignment of copyright, the author of each individual work in the collection retains copyright in
that work.

The compiler who is author of the collection, owns copyright in the selection and arrangement of the separate contributions
including preface and any advertisement.

Works by the federal government

17 U.S.C. § 105, withholds copyright from all publications produced by the United States Government, and its agents or
employees while in their employment. All such work is therefore in the public domain in some sense.

Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States
Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.

The intent of the section is to place in the public domain all work of the United States Government, which is defined in 17
U.S.C. § 101 as work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person's official
duties. Contractors are not employees.

Withholding of copyright does not mean full accessibility. Nothing in the law prohibits the United States government from
limiting commercial access to its (uncopyrighted) work.

The government produces a lot of top secret materials that are not protected by copyright, but have other access restrictions.

Even in the case of non-secret materials there are specific prohibitions against automatic access to work otherwise covered
under 17 U.S.C. § 105 for commercial purposes.

Federal and state laws are not copyrighted

Federal statutes are in the public domain and no copyright attaches to them. The same is true of court decisions.

The citizens are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners, regardless of who actually drafts the provisions, because the
law derives its authority from the consent of the public, expressed through the democratic process. (State of Georgia v
Harrison Co, 548 F Supp 110, 114 (ND Ga 1982))

Edicts of government, such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar
official legal documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy. This applies to such works whether they are
Federal, State, or local as well as to those of foreign governments. (Compendium II: Copyright Office Practices, section
206.01 Paragraph 3.6)

The exclusion of legislation from the scope of copyright laws dates to 1834 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 US (8 Pet) 591, 668
(1834), when the Supreme Court interpreted the first federal copyright laws and held that "no reporter has or can have any
copyright in the written opinions delivered by this Court".

“it would be absurd, for a legislature to claim the copyright; and no one else can do it, for they are the authors, and cause them
to be published without copyright … Statutes were never copyrighted.”
“it is the bounden duty of government to promulgate its statutes in print”.
“all countries … subject to the sovereignty of the laws” hold the promulgation of the laws, from whatever source, “as essential
as their existence.”
“If either statutes or decisions could be made private property, it would be in the power of an individual to shut out the light by
which we guide our actions.” (Wheaton v Peters, 33 US (8 Pet) 591, 668 (1834))

In Banks v Manchester (128 US 244, 9 S Ct 36 (1888)) the United States Supreme Court denied a copyright to a court
reporter in opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court, on the grounds that
“There has always been a judicial consensus, from the time of the decision in the case of Wheaton v Peters, that no copyright
could, under the statutes passed by Congress, be secured in the products of the labour done by judicial officers in the
discharge of their judicial duties. The whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of
the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a declaration of unwritten law, or an
interpretation of a constitution or statute.”

In Howell v Miller, (91 F 129 (1898)) Justice Harlan denied an injunction sought for the compiler of Michigan statutes, holding
that “no one can obtain the exclusive right to publish the laws of the state in a book prepared by him.”

Exclusive rights

There are five basic rights protected by copyright, and they are sometimes called the five "pillars" of copyright. The owner of
copyright has the exclusive right to do and to authorize others to do the following:

To reproduce the work in copies or phonorecords;
To prepare derivative works based upon the work;
To distribute copies or phonorecords of the work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
To publicly perform the work, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion
pictures and other audiovisual works;
To publicly display the work, in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work.

A violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder is said to be a copyright infringement.

Transfers and licenses

Three types of transfers exist for copyrighted works.

Assignment
Exclusive License
Non-exclusive License

Assignment and exclusive licenses, require the transfer to be in writing. Nonexclusive licenses need not be in writing and they
may be implied by the circumstances.

Transfers of copyright always involve one or more of the exclusive rights of copyright. For instance, a license may provide a
right to perform a work, but not to reproduce it or to prepare a derivative work (adaptation right).

The terms of the license is governed by the applicable contract law, however there is substantial academic debate as to what
extent the Copyright Act preempts state contract law principles.

An author, after transferring a copyright, can terminate the transfer under certain circumstances. This right to terminate the
transfer is absolute and cannot be waived.

Duration of copyright

Works created in or after 1978 are extended copyright protection for a term defined in 17 U.S.C. § 302.

With the passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, these works are granted copyright protection for a term
ending 70 years after the death of the author. If the work was a work for hire (e.g., those created by a corporation) then
copyright persists for 120 years after creation or 95 years after publication, whichever is shorter.

Copyrightable works created before 1978 that had not entered the public domain in 1978 received protection for the term in
17 U.S.C. § 302 with the exception that those copyrights would not expire before 2003.

Prior to 1978, works had to be published or registered to receive copyright protection.

Upon the effective date of the 1976 Act (January 1, 1978) this requirement was removed and these works received protection
despite having not been published or registered.

Congress intended to provide an incentive for these authors to publish their unpublished works. To provide that incentive these
works, if published before 2003, will not have their protection expire until 2048.

All works published in the United States before 1923 are in the public domain; works created before 1978 but not published
until recently may be protected until 2047.

For works that received their copyright before 1978, a renewal had to be filed in the work's 28th year with the Library of
Congress Copyright Office for its term of protection to be extended.

The need for renewal was eliminated in 1992, but works that had already entered the public domain for non-renewal did not
regain copyright protection.

As a result due to changes in the applicable laws, works published before 1964 that were not renewed are in the public
domain and no works will enter the public domain until 2019

Before 1972, sound recordings were not subject to federal copyright, but copying was nonetheless regulated under various
state torts and statutes, some of which had no duration limit.

The Sound Recording Amendment of 1972 extended federal copyright to recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972 (the
effective date of the act), and declared that recordings fixed before that date would remain subject to state or common law
copyright.

The Copyright Act of 1976 maintained this until 2047, which was subsequently extended by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act to 2067. As a result, no sound recording can reliably be considered in the public domain in the United States
before that date, even if the recording was in existence before 1923 and even if it originated in another country where it has
entered the public domain. Capitol Records v. Naxos of America (2005).

Registration of copyright

As the United States has joined the Berne Convention, registration is no longer necessary to provide copyright protection.
Copyright in the United States automatically attaches upon the creation of an original work of authorship.

Registration is adviced as registration with the Copyright Office puts a copyright holder in a better position if litigation arises
over the copyright. Registration is still necessary to obtain statutory damages in case of infringement.

Registration of copyright refers to the act of registering the work with the United States Copyright Office, which is an office of
the Library of Congress.

Copyright Act § 407 provides that the owner of copyright in a published or unpublished work may, at any time during the time
he holds copyright, register the work with the Copyright Office.

It's not necessary for any author to register prior to bringing suit for violation of the rights of attribution or integrity in a work of
visual art, pursuant to Copyright Act § 106A.

Deposit requirement

The United States Copyright Office requires that applicants for registration must deposit with that office copies of the work for
which protection is sought.

This requirement serves two purposes.

if an action arises from the infringement of the work, the owner may prove that the material that is infringed is exactly the same
material for which the owner has secured a registration.

it assists the Library of Congress in building its collection of works.

The Copyright Office has authority to make some exceptions to this rule by regulation. Failure to comply with the deposit
requirement, as modified by Copyright Office regulations, is punishable by fine, but does not result in forfeiture of copyright.

Subject matter jurisdiction

The United States district courts have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over copyright cases.

Infringement

Only protected work can be infringed. Infringement is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 501. Infringement requires:

a protected work

that the defendant copied the protected work

that the defendant's copying of the protected work was an infringement

Even if a defendant copied protected works that act might be permissible under one of the defenses or limitations. Fair use is
one such defense. Quoting from a book in a review might be a copying of protected material, however this copying may well
be permissible under 17 U.S.C. § 107. The fair use factors are described below.

Parodies

A parody can be considered a derivative work under United States Copyright Law, and thus within the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner.

A parody may also qualify for the "fair use" exception to the exclusive rights, which is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107.

Parodic works are not automatically fair use of the material parodied. The Supreme Court of the United States stated that
parody "is the use of some elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that
author's works."

That commentary function provides some justification for use of the older work.

A satire does not require use of the original work to make its point. (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.)

Defenses, exceptions and limitations

Defenses, exceptions and limitations protect both the boundary with the free expression guarantees of the First Amendment
and establish carve-outs to address specific situations.

Some of the most important include:

Subject matter limitations and the "idea/expression dichotomy".

Copyright applies only to certain subject matter, codified within 17 USC 102.

Works that are not "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression" are not subject to copyright.

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) codifies that copyright protection does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, etc. Facts
may not be copyrighted. Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service (1991)

The "fair use" exception is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107, and states that

"the fair use of a copyrighted work ... is not an infringement of copyright."

The section lists four factors that must be assessed to determine whether a particular use is fair.

The first sale doctrine is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109, and limits the rights of copyright holders to control the distribution and
display of copies of their works. The owner of a particular copy is entitled to "sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of
that copy" and to "display the copy publicly ... to viewers present at the place where the copy is located."

The "good faith" defense (Section 504(c)(2)) protects educational institutions, libraries, archives, and public broadcasters, by
permitting the court to limit statutory damages to only $200 if they reasonably believed their infringement was a fair use under
17 U.S.C. § 107.

17 U.S.C. § 108 and § 110-122 include specific exemptions for types of works and particular entities, such as libraries (§
108), public broadcasters (§ 110 and § 118), braille (§ 121), software backup copies (§ 117), "cover license" permitting
sound recording covers (§ 115), and jukebox compulsory licenses (§ 116).

Section 512 ("OCILLA", passed as part of the DMCA in 1998) provides a contingent "safe harbor" for online service
providers from secondary liability for their users' copy infringements.

Government infringement

The U.S. government, its agencies and officials, and corporations owned or controlled by it, are subject to suit for copyright
infringement. All infringement claims against the U.S. that did not arise in a foreign country must be filed with the United States
Court of Federal Claims within three years of the infringing action.

Claims filed in the wrong court are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The government and its agencies are also
authorized to settle the infringement claims out of court.

Provisions for the handicapped

There is specific statutory provision for reproduction of material for the blind or other persons with disabilities. Specific
legislation permits the reproduction of copyright works in Braille, audio, electronic, Web-Braille, or other necessary formats.
The program is administered by the National Library Service for the Blind and Physically Handicapped (NLS).

Relief available for infringement

A person whose copyright has been infringed may seek relief. These remedies, however, require the copyright holder to
actively enforce his or her rights. There is no "copyright police" that enforces copyright without the right holder complaining.

The FBI investigates cases of criminal infringement but not on its own. The FBI investigates cases where a complaint is
received from the copyright holder. The FBI has its own guidelines on which cases to investigate.

Civil remedies

A copyright holder must file a lawsuit in federal court to pursue his or her remedies. These remedies fall into two general
categories:

Injunctions and damages.

Injunctions: Copyright Act § 502 authorizes courts to grant both preliminary and permanent injunctions against copyright
infringement and against violations of the author's rights of attribution and integrity in works of visual art.

There are also provisions for impounding allegedly infringing copies, phonorecords, and other materials used to infringe, and
for their ultimate destruction upon a final judgment of infringement.

Damages and/or profits: Section 504 of the 1976 Act gives the copyright owner/author a choice of recovering:

(1) their actual damages and any additional profits of the defendant; or

(2) statutory damages.

Equitable relief

Both temporary and permanent injunctions are available to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright. Where the infringer
is the government, however, injunctions are not available and the copyright holder can only seek monetary damages.

One form of equitable relief that is available in copyright cases is a seizure order.

At any time during the lawsuit, the court may order the impoundment of any and all copies of the infringing products. The
seizure order may include materials used to produce such copies, such as master tapes, film negatives, printing plates, etc.
Items that are impounded during the course of the lawsuit can, if the plaintiff wins, be ordered destroyed as part of the final
decree.

Monetary damages

A copyright holder can also seek monetary damages. Injunctions and damages are not mutually exclusive. One can have
injunctions and no damages, or
damages and no injunctions, or
both injunctions and damages.

There are two types of damages: actual damages and profits, or statutory damages. During the course of the lawsuit, the
copyright holder can ask the court for both, in the alternative. However, at the end of the case, they are mutually exclusive:
Only one can be awarded and not the other.

Actual damages are the actual losses suffered by the copyright holder as a result of the infringement.

Profits are the profits gained by the wrongdoer as a result of the infringement.

In theory, the copyright holder can recover both his or her own actual damages, and also the wrongdoer’s profits.

Statutory damages are available as an alternative to actual damages and profits. This is sometimes preferable if actual damages
and profits are either too small, or too difficult to prove, or both. There are, however, situations where statutory damages are
not available. 17 U.S.C. § 412 provides:

Statutory damages are not available if the work is unpublished and the infringement began before the effective date of its
registration.

Statutory damages are not available if the work is published but the infringement commenced after the first publication and
before the effective date of its registration, unless registration is made within three months after the first publication.

Statutory damages are calculated per work infringed.

Statutory damages range from a few hundred dollars to hundreds of thousands:

Statutory damages range from $750 per work to $150,000 per work

In case of “innocent infringement”, the range is $200 to $150,000 per work. "Innocent" is a technical term. In particular, if the
work carries a copyright notice, the infringer cannot claim innocence.

In case of “willful infringement” (again, “willful” is a technical term), the range is $750 to $300,000 per work.

Damages in copyright cases can be very high. In Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason Inc., a 2003 lawsuit between a
publisher of stock analysis newsletters against a company that buys one copy of the newsletters and makes multiple copies for
use in-house, the jury awarded damages - actual damages for some newsletters and statutory damages for other newsletters -
totaling $20 million.

Attorney’s fees

Cost and attorney fees: Copyright Act § 505 permits courts, in their discretion, to award costs against either party and to
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.

The court may (but is not required to) award to the "prevailing party" a reasonable attorney’s fees. This applies to both the
winning plaintiff (right holder) and the winning defendant (accused infringer). Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517 (1994)

However, attorney’s fees award is not available against the government. Like statutory damages, attorney’s fees are not
available if the work infringed is not registered at the time of infringement.

Criminal penalties

In addition to the civil remedies, the Copyright Act provides for criminal prosecution in some cases of willful copyright
infringement. There are also criminal sanctions for

fraudulent copyright notice,

fraudulent removal of copyright notice, and

false representations in applications for copyright registration.

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act imposes criminal sanctions for certain acts of circumvention and interference with
copyright management information. There are no criminal sanctions for violating the rights of attribution and integrity held by the
author of a work of visual art.

Criminal penalties for copyright infringement include:

A fine of not more than $500,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, for the first offense.

A fine of not more than $1 million and imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, for repeated offenses.

Nonprofit libraries, archives, education institutions and public broadcasting entities are exempt from criminal prosecution.

Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).

Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act extended copyright terms in the United States by 20 years. Before the act (under the Copyright Act of 1976), copyright lasted for the life of the author plus 50 years, or 75 years for a work of corporate authorship. The act became Public Law 105-298 on October 27, 1998.

The Copyright Term Extension Act extended these terms to life of the author plus 70 years and 95 years respectively. The act also affected copyright terms for copyrighted works published prior to January 1, 1978, increasing their term of protection by 20 years as well.

This effectively 'froze' the advancement date of the public domain in the United States for works covered by the older fixed term copyright rules. Under this act, no additional works made in 1923 or afterwards that were still copyrighted in 1998 will enter the public domain until 2019, unless the owner of the copyright relases them into the public domain prior to that.

Unlike copyright extension legislation in the European Union, the Sonny Bono Act did not revive copyrights that had already expired. The act did extend the terms of protection set for works that were already copyrighted, and is retroactive in that sense. However, works created before January 1, 1978 but not published or registered for copyright until recently are addressed in a special section (17 U.S.C. § 303) and may remain protected until 2047.

Works published before 1923 are all in the public domain.

17 U.S.C. § 105, witholds copyright from all publications produced by the United States Government, and its agents or employees while in their employment. Such work is therefore in the public domain.

Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.

Nothing in the law prohibits the United States Government from limiting commercial access to any work produced under 17 U.S.C. § 105, and there are specific prohibitions against automatic access to work otherwise covered under 17 U.S.C. § 105 for commercial purposes.

Federal Statutes are in the public domain and no copyright attaches to them. Court decisions are also in the public domain and no copyright attaches to them..

"The citizens are the authors of the law, and therefore its owners, regardless of who actually drafts the provisions, because the law derives its authority from the consent of the public, expressed through the democratic process." (State of Georgia v Harrison Co, 548 F Supp 110, 114 (ND Ga 1982))

Judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy. This applies to such works whether they are Federal, State, or local, as well as to those of foreign governments. (The Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices, section 206.01 Paragraph 3.6)

The decisions of the courts, and legislation, would ensure that laws would be subject to copyright law, in some respects.

The American threshold for copyright coverage does contain requirements of both originality and creativity. According to the United States Supreme Court in Harper & Row Publishers Inc v Nation Enterprises, a work “must be original to the author”.

The United States Supreme Court has also interpreted Article I, § 8, cl 8 of the United States Constitution as requiring “independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”.

The exclusion of legislation from the scope of copyright laws goes back to 1834, when the Supreme Court interpreted the first federal copyright laws and held that “no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this Court“.

“it would be absurd, for a legislature to claim the copyright; and no one else can do it, for they are the authors, and cause them to be published without copyright … Statutes were never copyrighted.”

“all countries … subject to the sovereignty of the laws” hold the promulgation of the laws, from whatever source, “as essential as their existence.”

“If either statutes or decisions could be made private property, it would be in the power of an individual to shut out the light by which we guide our actions.” (Wheaton v Peters, 33 US (8 Pet) 591, 668 (1834))

In Banks v Manchester (128 US 244, 9 S Ct 36 (1888)) the United States Supreme Court denied a copyright to a court reporter in opinions of the Ohio Supreme Court, on the grounds that

“There has always been a judicial consensus, from the time of the decision in the case of Wheaton v Peters, that no copyright could, under the statutes passed by Congress, be secured in the products of the labour done by judicial officers in the discharge of their judicial duties. The whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a declaration of unwritten law, or an interpretation of a constitution or statute.”

In Howell v Miller, (91 F 129 (1898)) Justice Harlan denied an injunction sought for the compiler of Michigan statutes, holding that “no one can obtain the exclusive right to publish the laws of the state in a book prepared by him.”

In the United States, as with property, a copyright need not be granted or obtained through official registration with any
Government Office. Once an idea has been reduced to tangible form, for example by securing it in a fixed medium (such as a
drawing, sheet music, photograph, a videotape or a letter), the copyright holder is entitled to enforce his or her exclusive rights.

Though a copyright need not be officially registered for the copyright owner to begin exercising his exclusive rights, registration
of works (where the laws of that jurisdiction provide for registration) does have benefits.

Registration serves as prima facie evidence of a valid copyright and enables the copyright holder to seek statutory damages
and attorney's fees. In the USA, registering after an infringement only enables one to receive actual damages and lost profits.

The original holder of the copyright may be the employer of the actual author rather than the author himself if the work is a
"work for hire".

Copyrights are generally enforced by the holder in a civil law court, but there are also criminal infringement statutes. Criminal sanctions are generally aimed at serious counterfeiting activity, but are now becoming more commonplace.

Copyright Notice

Absence of the copyright symbol does not mean that the work is not covered by copyright. The work once created from originality through 'mental labor' is instantaneously considered copyrighted to that person.

The copyright notice consisting of a letter c inside a circle ©, or an parenthetical lower case c, or the word "copyright", each followed by the year(s) of the copyright and the name of the copyright holder were all part of previous United States statutory requirements.

In 1989 the U.S. adhered to the Berne Convention and the use of copyright notices has become optional to claim copyright. The Berne Convention makes copyright automatic. Notice of copyright does have consequences in terms of allowable damages in an infringement lawsuit in some places.

The phrase 'All rights reserved' was once a necessary formal notice that all rights granted under existing copyright law are
retained by the copyright holder and that legal action may be taken against copyright infringement. It was provided as a result
of the Buenos Aires Convention of 1910, which required some statement of reservation of rights to grant international
coverage in all the countries that were signatory to that convention.

Such notices are now superfluous, as every country that is a member of the Buenos Aires Convention is also a member of the Berne Convention, which hold a copyright to be valid in all signatory states without any formality of notice.

Exclusive Right

The phrase "exclusive right" indicates that only the copyright holder is free to exercise the attendant rights, and others are
prohibited using the work without the consent of the copyright holder.

A "negative right"

Often called a "negative right" copyright prohibits people (readers, viewers, or listeners, and primarily publishers and would be publishers) from doing something, rather than permitting copyright holder to do something.

As in the unregistered design right in English law and European law the rights of the copyright holder also permit the non-use or non-exploitation of copyright for its duration. This means an author can choose to exploit their copyright for some of the duration and then not for the rest, vice versa, or entirely one or the other.

There is a debate argueing that copyright does not exist merely to restrict third parties from publishing ideas and information, and that defining copyright purely as a negative right is incompatible with the public policy objective of encouraging authors to create new works and enrich the public domain.

The right to adapt a work means to transform the way in which the work is expressed. Examples include developing a stage
play or film script from a novel; translating a short story; and making a new arrangement of a musical work.