Intellectual Property Rights Case Law

A&M RECORDS, INC_ v_ NAPSTER, INC_, 239 F_3d 1004 (9th Cir_ 2001) - The complaint alleges that Napster, Inc. is a contributory and vicarious copyright infringer. Napster asserts an affirmative defense to the charge that its users directly infringe plaintiffs’ copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings. This is an Intellectual Property case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the defendant, Napster, could be held liable for contributory infringement of the plaintiff record company's copyrights. "We, therefore, conclude that the district court made sound findings related to Napster’s deleterious effect on the present and future digital download market. Moreover, lack of harm to an established market cannot deprive the copyright holder of the right to develop alternative markets for the works."

A&M v_ Napster, 2000 U_S_ Dist_ Lexis 6243 (N_D_Cal_ 2000) - Defendant moves for summary adjudication of the applicability of a safe harbor provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. section 512(a), to its business activities. The court determines that Napster does not meet the requirements of subsection 512(a) because it does not transmit, route, or provide connections for allegedly infringing material through its system. The court also finds summary adjudication inappropriate due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact about Napster’s compliance with subparagraph 512(i)(A), which a service provider must satisfy to enjoy the protection of any section 512 safe harbor.

AALMUHAMMED v. LEE, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2000) - "This is a copyright case involving a claim of coauthorship of the movie Malcolm X. We reject the "joint work" claim but remand for further proceedings on a quantum meruit claim." "Because the record before the district court established no genuine issue of fact as to Aalmuhammed's co-authorship of Malcolm X as a joint work, the district court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing his claims for declaratory judgment and an accounting resting on co-authorship." "Because New York has the stronger interest and would suffer more damage than California if its law were not applied, New York's six year statute of limitations governs. The claims were brought within six years of when they accrued. We therefore vacate the dismissal of Aalmuhammed's implied contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment claims and remand them for further proceedings."

ACADEMY OF MOTION PICTURE v. CREATIVE HOUSE, 944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) - "Appellant-cross-appellee Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences ("the Academy") brought an action in the district court for copyright and trademark infringement and related state law claims against appellee-cross-appellant Creative House Promotions, Inc. ("Creative House") for marketing the "Star Award," a gold figure closely resembling the Academy's famous "Oscar" statuette." "We conclude that the Academy's sleek, muscular gold statuette known as "Oscar," which is recognized world wide as a distinctive symbol of outstanding achievement in film, and which the Academy awards to a select group of talented individuals for the limited purpose of promoting the motion picture arts and sciences, is entitled to protection under the Copyright Act of 1976." "We also hold that the district court erred in ruling against the Academy on its Lanham Act, unfair competition, and unlawful dilution claims."

AMERICAN DENT. ASSN. v. DELTA DEN. PLANS ASSN., 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997) - Whether a taxonomy is copyrightable? "we do not conclude that the Code is a compilation covered by 17 U.S.C. § 103. It could be a compilation only if its elements existed independently and the ADA merely put them in order. A taxonomy is a way of describing items in a body of knowledge or practice; it is not a collection or compilation of bits and pieces of "reality." "Protecting variations on the forms could have permitted the author of an influential accounting treatise to monopolize the practice of double-entry bookkeeping. Yet copyright law does not permit the author to monopolize the revenues to be derived from an improved system of accounting - or of reporting dental procedures. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 17 J. Legal Studies 325, 350-53 (1989)." "The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."

AMERICAN GEOPHYSICAL UNION v. TEXACO INC., 60 F.3d 913 (2nd Cir. 1994) - "This interlocutory appeal presents the issue of whether, under the particular circumstances of this case, the fair use defense to copyright infringement applies to the photocopying of articles in a scientific journal." "We do not deal with the question of copying by an individual, for personal use in research or otherwise (not for resale), recognizing that under the fair use doctrine or the de minimis doctrine, such a practice by an individual might well not constitute an infringement. In other words, our opinion does not decide the case that would arise if Chickering were a professor or an independent scientist engaged in copying and creating files for independent research, as opposed to being employed by an institution in the pursuit of his research on the institution's behalf." "We agree with the District Court's conclusion that this particular copying was not fair use and therefore affirm."

BATJAC PROD. INC. v. GOODTIMES HOME VIDEO, 160 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) - This case primarily turns upon whether § 7 of the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (repealed effective 1978) ("1909 Act"), affords protection to intellectual properties that have "common law copyrights,"[n1] or protects only federal statutory copyrights. We hold that the language of § 7 does not apply to common law copyrights. a common law copyright in the underlying screenplay does not survive the motion picture's loss of copyright and falls into the public domain due to a failure to renew the movie's copyright.

BENSUSAN RESTAURANT CORP. v. KING, 126 F.3d 25 (2nd Cir. 1997) - "Bensusan Restaurant Corporation, located in New York City, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Stein, J.) dismissing its complaint against Richard B. King, a Missouri resident, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm." "Although we realize that attempting to apply established trademark law in the fast-developing world of the internet is somewhat like trying to board a moving bus, we believe that well-established doctrines of personal jurisdiction law support the result reached by the district court." "The acts giving rise to Bensusan's lawsuit - including the authorization and creation of King's web site, the use of the words "Blue Note" and the Blue Note logo on the site, and the creation of a hyperlink to Bensusan's web site - were performed by persons physically present in Missouri and not in New York."

BRIDGEMAN ART LIBRARY, LTD. v. COREL CORP., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) - "Copyrightability of color transparencies of paintings which themselves are in the public domain. A copy in a new medium is copyrightable only where, as often but not always is the case, the copier makes some identifiable original contribution." "it is uncontested that Bridgeman's images are substantially exact reproductions of public domain works, albeit in a different medium." "No one disputes that most photographs are copyrightable. In consequence, the issuance of a certificate of registration for a photograph proves nothing. And while the certificate is prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright,  including the originality of the work, the presumption is not irrebuttable."

BROWN v. AMES, 201 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 2000) - "Appellants Collectibles and Ames principally appeal the district court's determination that appellees' state law claims for violation of their rights of publicity are not preempted by the Copyright Act. The misappropriation consisted of appellants' unauthorized use of appellees' names and likenesses to market appellees' musical performances on CD's and audio cassettes for which appellants also lacked copyrights. Because a person's name and likeness in themselves are not copyrightable, and because the state law tort for misappropriation does not conflict with federal copyright law, appellees' claims are not preempted. As the other issues raised on appeal lack merit, the judgment is affirmed."

CAMPBELL v. ACUFF-ROSE MUSIC, INC., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) - That commercial character does not make it impossible for a use to be fair; it is merely one of the components of a fair use analysis. That a commercial parody can be fair use. "We are called upon to decide whether 2 Live Crew’s commercial parody of Roy Orbison‘s song, "Oh, Pretty Woman," may be a fair use within the meaning of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U. S. C. §107 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV). Although the District Court granted summary judgment for 2 Live Crew, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding the defense of fair use barred by the song’s commercial character and excessive borrowing. Because we hold that a parody‘s commercial character is only one element to be weighed in a fair use enquiry, and that insufficient consideration was given to the nature of parody in weighing the degree of copying, we reverse and remand."

CASS COUNTY MUSIC CO. v. MUEDINI, 55 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1995) - "The plaintiffs, Cass County Music Company and seven other music publishers, appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Vasfi Muedini, a defaulting party." The issue of the applicability of the § 110(5) exemption of the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. Section 110(5) of the Act provides an exception for small commercial establishments that play radio or television broadcasts on a "homestyle receiving apparatus." "The Port Town Family Restaurant is not exempt under § 110(5)." "We reverse the ruling of the district court and remand for entry of judgment for the plaintiffs and the determination of the appropriate relief."

CASTLE ROCK ENTERTAINMENT, INC. v. CAROL PUBLISHING GROUP, 150 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 1998) - Fair Use Defense. "This case presents two interesting and somewhat novel issues of copyright law. The first is whether The Seinfeld Aptitude Test, a trivia quiz book devoted exclusively to testing its readers' recollection of scenes and events from the fictional television series Seinfeld, takes sufficient protected expression from the original, as evidenced by the book's substantial similarity to the television series, such that, in the absence of any defenses, the book would infringe the copyright in Seinfeld. The second is whether The Seinfeld Aptitude Test (also referred to as The SAT) constitutes fair use of the Seinfeld television series." "We conclude that The SAT unlawfully copies from Seinfeld and that its copying does not constitute fair use and thus is an actionable infringement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in favor of Castle Rock."

CDN INC. v. KAPES, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999) - "We must decide whether prices listed in a wholesale coin price guide contain sufficient originality to merit the protection of the copyright laws." "Discoverable facts, like ideas, are not copyrightable. But compilations of facts are copyrightable even where the underlying facts are not. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991). The distinction between facts and non-facts, and between discovery and creation, lies at the heart of this case." "we affirm the district court's holding that the prices in the guides contain sufficient originality to sustain copyright protection." "CDN does not, nor could it, claim protection for its idea of creating a wholesale price guide, but it can use the copyright laws to protect its idea of what those prices are."

COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES v. REDD HORNE, 749 F.2d 154 (3rd Cir. 1984) - Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania which granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and enjoined defendants from exhibiting plaintiffs' copyrighted motion pictures. The defendants' activities constituted an unauthorized, and, therefore, an unlawful public performance of the plaintiffs' copyrighted motion pictures.

COMEDY III PRODUCTIONS v. NEW LINE CINEMA, 200 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2000) - Whether a portion of a public domain film used in a motion picture is a trademark capable of protection under the Lanham Act. But we will not entertain this expedition of trademark protection squarely into the dominion of copyright law, to allow for Lanham Act coverage of a piece of footage taken directly from a film by The Three Stooges. The Three Stooges film used in The Long Kiss Goodnight is not an enforceable trademark. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of Comedy III's First Amended Complaint.

COMEDY III PRODUCTIONS, INC. v. GARY SADERUP, INC., 25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001) - What is essentially a balancing test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation. Applying this test to the present case, we conclude that there are no such creative elements here and that the right of publicity prevails.

COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE v. REID, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) - In this case, an artist and the organization that hired him to produce a sculpture contest the ownership of the copyright in that work. To resolve this dispute, we must construe the "work made for hire" provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976 (Act or 1976 Act), 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 201(b), and in particular, the provision in § 101, which defines as a "work made for hire" a "work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment" (hereinafter § 101(1)).

COMPUSERVE, INC. v. PATTERSON, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) - The scope of the federal courts' jurisdictional powers in a new context, a computer network giant, CompuServe, appeals the dismissal, for lack of personal jurisdiction, of its complaint in which it sought a declaratory judgment that it had not infringed on the defendants' common law copyrights or otherwise engaged in unfair competition.

DASTAR CORP. V. TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM CORP., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). The U.S. Supreme
Court rendered an 8-0 verdict on 2 June 2003 in an appeal from a copyright lawsuit between two videotape
production companies filed in 1998. "Though the Lanham Act forbids a reverse passing off, this rule regarding the
misuse of trademarks is trumped by the fact that once a copyrighted work (or, for that matter, a patented invention)
passes into the public domain, anyone in the public may do anything they want with the work, with or without
attribution to the author."

EASTERN AMERICA TRIO PRODUCTS v. TANG ELECTRONIC CORP. (2000), where it was ruled that there is "very broad scope for copyright in photographs, encompassing almost any photograph that reflects more than 'slavish copying.'"

ELDRED v. ASHCROFT, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) In 1998, Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years. As in the case of prior extensions, principally in 1831, 1909, and 1976, Congress provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future copyrights alike. Petitioners are individuals and businesses whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain. They seek a determination that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause’s “limited Times” prescription and the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee. "Beneath the facade of their inventive constitutional interpretation, petitioners forcefully urge that Congress pursued very bad policy in prescribing the CTEA’s long terms. The wisdom of Congress’ action, however, is not within our province to second guess. Satisfied that the legislation before us remains inside the domain the Constitution assigns to the First Branch, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals."

ELDRED v. RENO, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001). "The plaintiffs in this case, corporations, associations, and individuals who rely for their voca- tions or avocations upon works in the public domain, challenge the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA), Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827. This marks the first occasion for an appellate court to address whether the First Amendment or the Copyright Clause of the Constitution of the United States constrains the Congress from extending for a period of years the duration of copyrights, both those already extant and those yet to come. We hold that neither does."

ELECTRONIC REALTY ASSOCS. v. PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORP., 935 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Kan. 1996). Defendant Paramount produced the "Top Gun" motion picture. Plaintiff developed a "Top Gun" training program. Plaintiff had a logo designed and had a promotional training video produced that incorporated allegedly protected trademark and copyrighted materials of defendant Paramount's "Top Gun" motion picture. Specifically, plaintiff's "Top Gun" promotional training video contains footage of defendant Paramount's "Top Gun" movie and the accompanying synchronization of the "Top Gun" musical compositions owned by defendant Famous Music. Plaintiff did not negotiate, nor obtain the necessary licenses to use the "Top Gun" footage or music in its promotional training video. Defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's declaratory judgment action with respect to personal jurisdiction and improper venue is denied. Defendants' alternative motion to transfer venue for the entire action is granted.

ERICKSON v. TRINITY THEATRE, INC., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff Karen Erickson brought this action seeking a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent the defendant Trinity Theatre d/b/a Trinity Square Ensemble ("Trinity") from performing three plays and using two videotapes to which she owned the copyrights. "As both the magistrate judge and the district court noted, public policy strongly favors the protections of copyrights. Given this fact, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in favoring copyright protection."

ESTATE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING v. CBS, INC., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999). The Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. brought this copyright infringement action against CBS, Inc. after CBS produced a video documentary that used, without authorization, portions of civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King's famous "I Have a Dream" speech at the March on Washington on August 28, 1963. The district court granted summary judgment to CBS on the ground that Dr. King had engaged in a general publication of the speech, placing it into the public domain. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 13 F. Supp.2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 1998). "A performance, no matter how broad the audience, is not a publication; to hold otherwise would be to upset a long line of precedent. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the Speech was broadcast live to a broad radio and television audience and was the subject of extensive contemporaneous news coverage. We follow the above cited case law indicating that release to the news media for contemporary coverage of a newsworthy event is only a limited publication." REVERSED AND REMANDED.

ETS-HOKIN v. SKYY SPIRITS INC., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). "[1] This case requires us to apply copyright principles to stylized photographs of a vodka bottle. Specifically, we must decide whether professional photographer Joshua Ets-Hokin's commercial photographs, dubbed "product shots, " of the Skyy Spirits vodka bottle merit copyright protection. Given the Copyright Act's low threshold for originality generally and the minimal amount of originality required to qualify a photograph in particular, we conclude that Ets-Hokin's photographs are entitled to copyright protection. [2] We also conclude that the district court erred in analyzing this case through the lens of derivative copyright. The photographs at issue cannot be derivative works because the vodka bottle--the alleged underlying work--is not itself subject to copyright protection. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment for Skyy Spirits and remand for consider­ation of whether infringement has occurred."

ETS-HOKIN v. SKYY SPIRITS INC., 323 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003) "[1] This long-running litigation is fundamentally about how many ways one can create an advertising photograph, called a "product shot," of a blue vodka bottle. We conclude there are not very many. We therefore affirm the district court's summary judgment because the allegedly infringing photographs are not "virtually identical" as required upon application of the defensive doctrines of merger and scenes a faire. We agree fully with the district court that such defenses were appropriately invoked. [2] Indeed, we held as much when this case was previously before this court. See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000)."

FEIST PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. RURAL TELEPHONE SERVICE CO., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). This case requires us to clarify the extent of copyright protection available to telephone directory white pages. The Feist directory that is the subject of this litigation covers 11 different telephone service areas in 15 counties and contains 46,878 white pages listings -- compared to Rural's approximately 7,700 listings. Like Rural's directory, Feist's is distributed free of charge and includes both white pages and yellow pages. Feist and Rural compete vigorously for yellow pages advertising. "We conclude that the names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural's combined white and yellow pages directory. As a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity."

FELTNER v. COLUMBIA PICTURES, 523 U.S. 34 (1998). "Section 504(c) of the Copyright Act permits a copyright owner “to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages . . . , in a sum of not less than $500 or more than $20,000 as the court considers just.” 90 Stat. 2585, as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). In this case, we consider whether §504(c) or the Seventh Amendment grants a right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages. We hold that although the statute is silent on the point, the Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial, which includes a right to a jury determination of the amount of statutory damages. We therefore reverse."

FONOVISA, INC. v. CHERRY AUCTION, INC., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). "This is a copyright and trademark enforcement action against the operators of a swap meet, sometimes called a flea market, where third-party vendors routinely sell counterfeit recordings that infringe on the plaintiff's copyrights and trademarks. The district court dismissed on the pleadings, holding that the plaintiffs, as a matter of law, could not maintain any cause of action against the swap meet for sales by vendors who leased its premises. The district court's decision is published. Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492 (E.D. Cal. 1994). We reverse."

GAY TOYS, INC. v. BUDDY L CORP., 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983). "The issue raised in this appeal is whether toys are copyrightable subject matter under the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810. The district court held that toys are not copyrightable because they are "useful articles" as defined under § 101 of the statute. 522 F.Supp. 622 (E.D.Mich. 1981)." "This case falls within the 1976 Copyright Act, which was a general revision of the 1909 Copyright Act. However, some of the cases interpreting the 1909 Act will be helpful in interpreting the 1976 Act." "because we conclude that the Air Coupe is not a "useful article," we need not consider whether certain aspects of the item are copyrightable individually as separate and independent features. This provision applies only to items that are first, as a whole, disallowed copyright protection as "useful articles," and thus has no application to the present case." "The district court's judgment is vacated."

GOLDSTEIN v. CALIFORNIA, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). "Petitioners' attack on the constitutionality of § 653h has many facets. First, they contend that the statute establishes a state copyright of unlimited duration, and thus conflicts with Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution. Second, petitioners claim that the state statute interferes with the implementation of federal policies inherent in the federal copyright statutes. 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq." "We conclude that the State of California has exercised a power which it retained under the Constitution, and that the challenged statute, as applied in this case, does not intrude into an area which Congress has, up to now, preempted. Until and unless Congress takes further action with respect to recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972, the California statute may be enforced against acts of piracy such as those which occurred in the present case."

HARPER & ROW v. NATION ENTERPRISES, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). "Fair use" provision of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107, sanctions the unauthorized use of quotations from a public figure's unpublished manuscript. "Petitioners brought a successful copyright action against The Nation. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's finding of infringement, holding that The Nation's act was sanctioned as a "fair use" of the copyrighted material. We granted certiorari, 467 U.S. 1214 (1984), and we now reverse." "The Nation conceded that its verbatim copying of some 300 words of direct quotation from the Ford manuscript would constitute an infringement unless excused as a fair use. Because we find that The Nation's use of these verbatim excerpts from the unpublished manuscript was not a fair use, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."

HASBRO BRADLEY, INC. v. SPARKLE TOYS, INC., 780 F.2d 189 (2nd Cir. 1985). "Since Sparkle admits to unauthorized copying, the only issue before us in reviewing the grant of the preliminary injunction is whether Hasbro's copyrights for the toys are valid." "Sparkle attempts to meet this burden with various lines of argument, all stemming from the fact that the toys were initially sold by Takara without copyright notice." "Sparkle's most basic position is that sale of the unmarked toys by Takara in Japan injected the designs into the public domain. If the designs were truly in the public domain, Hasbro could have enjoyed no copyrights in the toys, and Sparkle's copying would have been permissible."

HEMINGWAY'S ESTATE v. RANDOM HOUSE, INC., 23 N.Y.2d 341 (1968). The complaint seeks an injunction and damages, alleging four causes of action. "The first three, in which the Estate of Hemingway and his widow join as plaintiffs, are (1) that “Papa Hemingway” consists, in the main, of literary matter composed by Hemingway in which he had a common-law copyright; (2)that publication would constitute an unauthorized appropriation of Hemingway's work and would compete unfairly with his other literary creations; and (3) that Hotchner wrongfully used material which was imparted to him in the course of a confidential and fiduciary relationship with Hemingway. In the fourth cause of action, Mary Hemingway asserts that the book invades the right to privacy to which she herself is entitled under section 51 of the Civil Rights Law." "Whether conversations of a gifted and highly regarded writer may become the subject of, common-law copyright, even though the speaker, himself has not reduced his words to writing." affirmed.

JACKSON v. MPI HOME VIDEO, 694 F. Supp. 483 (N.D. Ill. 1988). "The Court, on a motion for preliminary injunction should grant the motion when plaintiff has shown (1) a better than negligible probability of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury, (3) lack of serious adverse effect on defendants, and (4) the injunction is not inconsistent with public interest. A.J. Canfield v. Vess, 796 F.2d 903, 906 (7th Cir.1986)."

JOHNSON v. JONES, 149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998). "This typical case of deliberate "passing off" involves a defendant's passing off his own product as that of the plaintiff. This, however, is the quintessential "reverse passing off"; here, the defendant is deliberately passing off the plaintiff's product as his own. If anything, this variety of "deliberate theft of a marketholder's goodwill" is more egregious than ordinary passing off, as it involves actual theft. This is an "exceptional case," because Tosch literally stole Johnson's plans.

KELLEY v. ARRIBA SOFT CORP. 77 F. Supp.2d 1116, (C.D. Cal. 1999). "On apparent first impression, the Court holds the use by an Internet "visual search engine" of others' copyrighted images is a prima facia copyright violation, but it may be justified under the "fair use" doctrine. The Court finds that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the "fair use" doctrine applies, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is not violated." "Fair use is an affirmative defense, and defendants carry the burden of proof on the issue. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1995); Columbia Pictures Ind. v. Miramax Films Corp., 11 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1187 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("[b]ecause fair use is an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the burden of proof on all of its factors"). Based on an analysis of the factors, the Court finds there is fair use here."

KENNEDY v. NATIONAL JUVENILE DETENTION ASSN., 187 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 1999). "Edwin Kennedy appeals the district court's decision to dismiss his copyright infringement claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Kennedy concedes that the contractual agreement conferred upon the NJDA the right to reproduce and publish his report, however he argues that it did not grant either the NJDA or IJJC the right to create derivative works from it. The clause for copyrightable works was similar, but different in important respects: "the government reserves a royalty-free non-exclusive and irreversible license to reproduce, publish, and use such materials in whole or in part." The issue is whether "use," the third verb in the clause, unambiguously grants to the defendants the right to prepare derivative works.

LEE v. A.R.T. COMPANY, 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997). "The district court concluded that A.R.T.'s mounting of Lee's works on tile is not an "original work of authorship" because it is no different in form or function from displaying a painting in a frame... No one believes that a museum violates § 106(2) every time it changes the frame of a painting that is still under copyright, although the choice of frame or glazing affects the impression the art conveys" Lee attacks the district court's conclusion that A.R.T.'s mounting process cannot create a derivative work because the change to the work "as a whole" is not sufficiently original to support a copyright. "Lee's note cards and lithographs are not works of visual art under this definition, so she could not invoke § 106A even if A.R.T.'s use of her works to produce kitsch had damaged her reputation. It would not be sound to use § 106(2) to provide artists with exclusive rights deliberately omitted from the Visual Artists Rights Act."

LEICESTER v. WARNER BROS., 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). The 801 Tower in Los Angeles was used as the Second Bank of Gotham in Batman Forever. Andrew Leicester claims copyright protection for these towers along with other artistic works he created in a courtyard space called the Zanja Madre. Following a bench trial, the district court found that the streetwall towers (even though they have artistic elements) are part of the "architectural work." As such, the court concluded, pictures taken of the streetwall towers along with the 801 Tower are not infringing pursuant to the exemption for pictorial representations of buildings in the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a). Leicester argues that the court erred by refusing to consider the Zanja Madre as a unitary sculptural work, and by construing the 1990 Act so as to eliminate separate protection for sculptural works attached to buildings. We disagree that the court erred in either respect (or in any other), and affirm."

LOS ANGELES NEWS SERVICE v. REUTERS TELEVISION INTERNATIONAL, INC., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998). "On this appeal we must decide whether, under the Copyright Act, a plaintiff may recover actual damages accruing from the unauthorized exploitation abroad of copyrighted work infringed in the United States; whether defendants' exploitation of the work was protected as fair use; and whether the district court erred in its award of statutory damages." "We therefore hold that LANS is entitled to recover damages flowing from exploitation abroad of the domestic acts of infringement committed by defendants." "In sum, the district court, having found that only one of the four statutory factors weighed in favor of defendants, correctly concluded that the fair use defense did not apply."

LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. BORLAND INTERNATIONAL INC., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). "This appeal requires us to decide whether a computer menu command hierarchy is copyrightable subject matter. In particular, we must decide whether, as the district court held, plaintiff-appellee Lotus Development Corporation's copyright in Lotus 1-2-3, a computer spreadsheet program, was infringed by defendant-appellant Borland International, Inc., when Borland copied the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy into its Quattro and Quattro Pro computer spreadsheet programs." "On appeal, Borland does not dispute that it factually copied the words and arrangement of the Lotus menu command hierarchy. Rather, Borland argues that it "lawfully copied the unprotectable menus of Lotus 1-2-3." Borland contends that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is not copyrightable because it is a system, method of operation, process, or procedure foreclosed from protection by 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Borland also raises a number of affirmative defenses."

MAI SYSTEMS CORP. v. PEAK COMPUTER, INC., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). "Peak Computer, Inc. is a company organized in 1990 that maintains computer systems for its clients. Peak maintains MAI computers for more than one hundred clients in Southern California. This accounts for between fifty and seventy percent of Peak's business." "In August, 1991, Eric Francis left his job as customer service manager at MAI and joined Peak. Three other MAI employees joined Peak a short time later. Some businesses that had been using MAI to service their computers switched to Peak after learning of Francis's move." "On March 17, 1992, MAI filed suit in the district court against Peak, Peak's president Vincent Chiechi, and Francis. The complaint includes counts alleging copyright infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, trademark infringement, false advertising, and unfair competition."

METRO-GOLDWYN MAYER STUDIOS v. GROKSTER, LTD., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003). "Plaintiffs and Defendants StreamCast Networks, Inc. and Grokster, Ltd. (“Defendants”) filed cross-motions for summary judgment with regard to contributory and vicarious infringement. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ conduct renders them liable for copyright infringement committed by users of Defendants’ software. Defendants argue, however, that they merely provide software to users over whom they have no control, and thus that no liability may accrue to them under copyright law. Both parties believe that there are no disputed issues of fact material to Defendants’ liability, and thus that there are no factual disputes requiring a trial. Instead, both sides maintain that the only question before the Court (as to liability) is a legal one: whether Defendants’ materially undisputed conduct gives rise to copyright liability."

METRO-GOLDWYN-MAYER STUDIOS, INC. v. GROKSTER LTD., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004). "This appeal presents the question of whether distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing computer networking software may be held contributorily or vicariously liable for copyright infringements by users. Under the circumstances presented by this case, we conclude that the defendants are not liable for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement and affirm the district court's partial grant of summary judgment."

MILLER v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1981). "The issue is whether a made-for-television movie dramatizing the crime infringes upon a copyrighted book depicting the unsuccessful ransom attempt. After careful and lengthy study and consideration, we conclude that the verdict for plaintiff must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial because at the request of plaintiff and over defendants' objection, the case was presented and argued to the jury on a false premise: that the labor of research by an author is protected by copyright. The decision to reverse is made more difficult because the record and the arguments to this Court reveal sufficient evidence to support a finding of infringement and a verdict for plaintiff under correct theories of copyright law. Plaintiff's presentation and argument to the jury, however, make it improper to conclude that the short erroneous instruction, imbedded in a field of proper instructions, was harmless error."

MILWAUKEE CONCRETE STUDIOS v. FJELD MFG. CO., 8 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1993). A question under the copyright venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(a). "This case does not involve the discretionary interpretation of disputed facts, however, but application of the copyright venue statute to undisputed jurisdictional facts. The issue is therefore one of statutory interpretation and is subject to de novo review."

MITEL, INC. v. IQTEL, INC., 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff Mitel, Inc. appeals the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction in this action for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). At issue is the protectability of a set of four-digit numeric instructions known as "command codes." "Mitel contends that the district court erred in denying its motion for a preliminary injunction based upon the court's conclusion that Mitel failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits of its claim." "Specifically, Mitel argues that the district court erred by concluding that (1) Mitel's command codes are unprotectable under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) because they are a "procedure process, system, [or] method of operation"; (2) Mitel's command codes are unprotectable under the scenes a faire doctrine; and (3) Iqtel's use of the command codes is a fair use under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and affirm."

MORRIS v. BUSINESS CONCEPTS, INC., 259 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001). "Plaintiff Lois Morris, a journalist, brought suit against defendants Business Concepts, Inc., James Maher, and Petra Maher (collectively "BCI") for copyright infringement arising out of BCI's unauthorized use of Morris's articles in its newsletter. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Richard Conway Casey, Judge, granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the copyright claims. Because we agree with the district court that registration of the collective works in which Morris's articles initially appeared did not satisfy her registration requirement for the purposes of maintaining an infringement action, we affirm."

MORRIS v. BUSINESS CONCEPTS, INC., 283 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2001). "In response to the petition for rehearing, we write to clarify part of the reasoning in our opinion. Because it might significantly affect some future case, we wish to modify our opinion by removing Part I." "We therefore conclude that regardless whether Conde Nast was a copyright owner of Morris's articles, its registration of the collective works in which they appeared do not satisfy § 411(a)'s requirements with respect to Morris." "We have considered Morris's arguments with respect to Parts II and III of our opinion, and find them to be unconvincing. We therefore deny the petition for rehearing.

MORRISSEY v. PROCTER & GAMBLE CO., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). The plaintiff is the copyright owner of a set of rules for a sales promotional contest of the "sweepstakes" type involving the social security numbers of the participants. Plaintiff alleges that the defendant infringed, by copying, almost precisely, Rule 1. "When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that "the topic necessarily requires," Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 1 Cir., 1905, 140 F. 539, 541; cf. Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright, 64-65 (1967), if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance." The matters embraced in Rule 1 are straightforward and simple. "We hold that copyright does not extend to the subject matter at all, and plaintiff cannot complain even if his particular expression was deliberately adopted."

N.F.L. v. PRIMETIME 24 JOINT VENTURE, 211 F.3d 10 (2nd Cir. 2000). The issue is whether PrimeTime publicly performed or displayed NFL's copyrighted material. PrimeTime argues that capturing or uplinking copyrighted material and transmitting it to a satellite does not constitute a public display or performance of that material. PrimeTime argues that any public performance or display occurs during the downlink from the satellite to the home subscriber in Canada, which is in a foreign country where the Copyright Act does not apply." "Public performance or display includes "each step in the process by which a protected work wends its way to its audience." David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Under that analysis, it is clear that PrimeTime's uplink transmission of signals captured in the United States is a step in the process by which NFL's protected work wends its way to a public audience... PrimeTime infringed the NFL's copyright."

NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOC. v. MOTOROLA, INC., 105 F.3d 841 (2nd Cir. 1997). "The crux of the dispute concerns the extent to which a state law "hot-news" misappropriation claim based on International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) ("INS"), survives preemption by the federal Copyright Act and whether the NBA's claim fits within the surviving INS-type claims. We hold that a narrow "hot-news" exception does survive preemption. However, we also hold that appellants' transmission of "real-time" NBA game scores and information tabulated from television and radio broadcasts of games in progress does not constitute a misappropriation of "hot news" that is the property of the NBA." "We vacate the injunction entered by the district court and order that the NBA's claim for misappropriation be dismissed. We affirm the district court's dismissal of the NBA's claim for false advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act."

NATIONAL CONF. v. MULTISTATE LEGAL STUDIES, 692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982). "In this action for copyright infringement and unfair competition defendant Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. appeals from a permanent injunction imposed by the district court against Legal Studies' use of the names PRELIMINARY MULTISTATE BAR EXAMINATION and PMBE to designate its test preparation service... The district court held that such use violated the unregistered trademark of the plaintiffs, the National Conference of Bar Examiners and the Educational Testing Service in the MULTISTATE BAR EXAMINATION or MBE. Legal Studies also appeals from the order of the district court dismissing its counterclaim which challenged the validity and constitutionality of the Copyright Office "secure test" regulation. We affirm the judgment order of the district court's dismissal of the counterclaim, 495 F.Supp. 34, but we reverse the order enjoining Legal Studies from using the name PRELIMINARY MULTISTATE BAR EXAMINATION and the initials PMBE."

NELSON-SALABES, INC. v. MORNINGSIDE DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 284 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2002). "We agree that NSI did not intend for Strutt to utilize the NSI Drawings in the construction of Satyr Hill without NSI's future involvement in the Project or its express consent. Therefore, like the district court, we are "satisfied that these facts do not support a finding that [NSI] granted Strutt [an implied] nonexclusive license." "The court, however, did not support its imposition of such liability by making the necessary predicate finding that the Defendants had been engaged in a "practical partnership." As such, we must vacate the imposition of joint and several liability on Morningside Holdings and Turner, and we remand this aspect of their appeal for any further proceedings that may be appropriate."

NEW YORK TIMES CO. v. TASINI, 533 U.S. 483 (2001). "This copyright case concerns the rights of freelance authors and a presumptive privilege of their publishers. Under agreements with the periodicals’ publishers, but without the freelancers’ consent, two computer database companies placed copies of the freelancers’ articles–along with all other articles from the periodicals in which the freelancers’ work appeared–into three databases. The freelance authors’ complaint alleged that their copyrights had been infringed by the inclusion of their articles in the databases." "We conclude that the Electronic Publishers infringed the Authors’ copyrights by reproducing and distributing the Articles in a manner not authorized by the Authors and not privileged by §201(c). We further conclude that the Print Publishers infringed the Authors’ copyrights by authorizing the Electronic Publishers to place the Articles in the Databases. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals."

NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, INC. v. COMLINE BUS. DATA, 166 F.3d 65 (2nd Cir.1999). "Defendants argue that: (1) Comline's abstracts did not infringe Nikkei's copyrights because they only copied unprotected facts; (2) Comline's abstracts constituted fair use; (3) the use of "Nikkei" as a reference to the source of the abstracts was not a trademark use; (4) district court abused its discretion in awarding statutory damages on the copyright claim; (5) the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees" "We 1) affirm the judgment of copyright infringement; 2) affirm the statutory damages; 3) affirm, as modified, the injunction against defendants based on copyright violations; 4) vacate and remand for reconsideration the awards of damages and declaratory judgment to ensure that those awards apply only to the 20 infringing abstracts; 5) affirm the award of attorney's fees; 4) reverse the judgment of trademark infringement; and 5) vacate the injunction related to defendants' use of Nikkei's trademark."

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS v. MICHIGAN DOC., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). "This is a copyright infringement case. The corporate defendant, Michigan Document Services, Inc., is a commercial copy shop that reproduced substantial segments of copyrighted works of scholarship, bound the copies into "coursepacks," and sold the coursepacks to students for use in fulfilling reading assignments given by professors at the University of Michigan. The copyshop acted without permission from the copyright holders, and the main question presented is whether the "fair use" doctrine codified at 17 U.S.C. Section(s) 107 obviated the need to obtain such permission... A three-judge panel of this court reversed the judgment on appeal, but a majority of the active judges of the court subsequently voted to rehear the case en banc. The appeal has now been argued before the full court. We agree with the district court that the defendants' commercial exploitation of the copyrighted materials did not constitute fair use."

ProCD, INC. v. ZEIDENBERG, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th. Cir. 1996). "Must buyers of computer software obey the terms of shrinkwrap licenses?" "Shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they violate a rule of positive law, or if they are unconscionable). Because no one argues that the terms of the license at issue here are troublesome, we remand with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff."

QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. L'ANZA RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL, INC., 523 U.S. 135 (1998). "17 U.S.C. § 106(3), gives the owner of a copyright the exclusive right to distribute copies of a copyrighted work. That exclusive right is expressly limited, however, by the provisions of §§107 through 120. Section 602(a) gives the copyright owner the right to prohibit the unauthorized importation of copies. The question presented by this case is whether the right granted by §602(a) is also limited by §§107 through 120. More narrowly, the question is whether the “first sale” doctrine endorsed in §109(a) is applicable to imported copies." "The District Court rejected petitioner’s defense based on the “first sale” doctrine recognized by §109 and entered summary judgment in favor of L’anza." "Based largely on its conclusion that §602 would be “meaningless” if §109 provided a defense in a case of this kind, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 98 F.3d 1109, 1114 (CA9 1996). "The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed."

QUINTANILLA v. TEXAS TELEVISION INC., 139 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 1998). "This is a copyright case. The father of the popular singer, Selena, sued a television station for infringement of his rights in a videotape of a concert that was made by the station. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant television station. Because the proof will not support plaintiffs' claim to sole ownership of the videotape, we affirm."

RANDOM HOUSE, INC. v. ROSETTA BOOKS LLC, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). "In this copyright infringement action, Random House, Inc. seeks to enjoin Rosetta Books LLC and its Chief Executive Officer from selling in digital format eight specific works on the grounds that the authors of the works had previously granted Random House – not Rosetta Books – the right to "print, publish and sell the work[s] in book form." Rosetta Books, on the other hand, claims it is not infringing upon the rights those authors gave Random House because the licensing agreements between the publisher and the author do not include a grant of digital or electronic rights. Relying on the language of the contracts and basic principles of contract interpretation, this Court finds that the right to "print, publish and sell the work[s] in book form" in the contracts at issue does not include the right to publish the works in the format that has come to be known as the "ebook." Accordingly, Random House's motion for a preliminary injunction is denied."

RANDOM HOUSE, INC. v. ROSETTA BOOKS LLC, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir. 2002). "Random House, Inc. appeals from the denial of a preliminary injunction that sought to enjoin appellee Rosetta Books LLC ("Rosetta") from continuing to sell as "ebooks" certain novels whose authors had granted Random House the exclusive right to publish, print, and sell their copyrighted works "in book form." The denial of a preliminary injunction is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Zervos v. Verizon New York, Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2001)." "without expressing any view as to the ultimate merits of the case, the Court concludes that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Random House's motion for a preliminary injunction, and consequently the judgment is affirmed."

RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. DIAMOND MULTIMEDIA SYS., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). "In this case involving the intersection of computer technology, the Internet, and music listening, we must decide whether the Rio portable music player is a digital audio recording device subject to the restrictions of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992." "the legislative history confirms the most logical reading of the statute, which we adopt: "indirectly" modifies the verb "is made" - in other words, modifies the making of the reproduction of the underlying digital music recording. Thus, a device falls within the Act's provisions if it can indirectly copy a digital music recording by making a copy from a transmission of that recording. Because the Rio cannot make copies from transmissions, but instead, can only make copies from a computer hard drive, it is not a digital audio recording device." AFFIRMED.

RUSSELL v. PRICE, 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979). "Defendants distributed copies of the film "Pygmalion", the copyright for which had expired. They were sued by the owners of the renewal copyright in the George Bernard Shaw play upon which the film was based. Defendants appeal the resulting judgment for damages and attorney fees. Plaintiffs cross appeal, claiming that the court erred in not awarding them statutory "in lieu" damages. We affirm. In 1913 Shaw registered a copyright on his stage play "Pygmalion". The renewal copyright on the play, obtained in 1941 and originally scheduled to expire in 1969, was extended by Congressional action to the year 1988. Shaw died in 1950 and the plaintiffs, except for Janus Films, are current proprietors of the copyright. Janus Films is a licensee." "we conclude that defendants' activities here infringed the subsisting copyright in Shaw's play and were properly enjoined."

SALINGER v. RANDOM HOUSE, INC., 811 F.2d 90 (2nd Cir. 1987). "This appeal presents the issue whether the biographer of a renowned author has made "fair use" of his subject's unpublished letters. The issue arises on an expedited appeal from an order of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Pierre N. Leval, Judge) denying a preliminary injunction sought by the well-known writer, J.D. Salinger, against Ian Hamilton and Random House, Inc., the author and publisher, respectively, of a book about Salinger and his writings. For reasons that follow, we conclude that a preliminary injunction should be issued." "We seriously doubt whether a critic reviewing a published collection of the letters could justify as fair use the extensive amount of expressive material Hamilton has copied. However that may be, if fair use is to have a more "limited scope" with respect to unpublished works, it is not available with respect to the current version of Hamilton's proposed biography."

SATAVA v. LOWRY, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003). "In this case, we must locate the faint line between unprotected idea and original expression in the context of realistic animal sculpture. We must decide whether an artist’s lifelike glass-in-glass sculptures of jellyfish are protectable by copyright. Because we conclude that the sculptures are composed of unprotectable ideas and standard elements, and also that the combination of those unprotectable elements is unprotectable, we reverse the judgment of the district court." "copyright law achieves its high purpose of enriching our culture by giving artists a financial incentive to create. But we must be careful in copyright cases not to cheat the public domain." "Satava’s glass-in-glass jellyfish sculptures, though beautiful, combine several unprotectable ideas and standard elements. These elements are part of the public domain. They are the common property of all, and Satava may not use copyright law to seize them for his exclusive use."

SELLE v. GIBB, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984). "The plaintiff, Ronald H. Selle, brought a suit against three brothers, Maurice, Robin and Barry Gibb, known collectively as the popular signing group, the Bee Gees, alleging that the Bee Gees, in their hit tune, "How Deep Is Your Love," had infringed the copyright of his song, "Let It End." The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor on the issue of liability in a bifurcated trial. The district court, Judge George N. Leighton, granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, for a new trial. Selle v. Gibb, 567 F.Supp. 1173 (N.D.Ill. 1983)." "because the plaintiff failed both to establish a basis from which the jury could reasonably infer that the Bee Gees had access to his song and to meet his burden of proving "striking similarity" between the two compositions, the grant by the district court of the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is affirmed."

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT AMERICA v. BLEEM, F.3d (9th Cir. 2000). "We must decide whether the unauthorized use of a "screen shot" - a frozen image from a personal video game - falls within the fair use exception to the law of copyright." "The only issue on appeal, however, is whether Bleem's unauthorized use of Sony PlayStation game screen shots in its advertising was a violation of Sony's copyright. The district court ruled in favor of Sony, entering a preliminary injunction against Bleem." "Given that all four factors weigh in favor of the conclusion that Bleem's use of the screen shots was fair, our attention must turn to whether the district court abused its discretion in entering injunctive relief in favor of Sony." "The way of simulations is a slippery one for Bleem and if it chooses to embark upon it, it must do so without the support of Sony's copyright. With that limitation in mind, we conclude that Bleem's use of Sony's copyrighted material was fair.

SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT v. CONNECTIX CORP., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000). "Sony produces and markets the Sony PlayStation console. Sony owns the copyright on the basic input-output system or BIOS, which is the software program that operates its PlayStation." "The defendant makes and sells a software program called "Virtual Game Station." "Connectix repeatedly copied Sony's copyrighted BIOS during a process of "reverse engineering." Sony claimed infringement and sought a preliminary injunction. The district court enjoined Connectix from selling the Virtual Game Station or from copying or using the Sony BIOS code in the development of other Virtual Game Station products." "We reverse and remand with instructions to dissolve the injunction. The intermediate copies made and used by Connectix during the course of its reverse engineering of the Sony BIOS were protected fair use. Any other intermediate copies made by Connectix do not support injunctive relief, even if those copies were infringing."

SONY CORP. OF AMER. v. UNIVERSAL CITY STUDIOS, INC., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). "The Betamax case." "Respondents alleged that some individuals had used Betamax video tape recorders (VTR’s) to record some of respondents‘ copyrighted works which had been exhibited on commercially sponsored television and contended that these individuals had thereby infringed respondents’ copyrights." "After a lengthy trial, the District Court denied respondents all the relief they sought and entered judgment for petitioners. 480 F.Supp. 429 (1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment on respondents‘ copyright claim, holding petitionersliable for contributory infringement and ordering the District Court to fashion appropriate relief. 659 F.2d 963 (1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U.S. 1116 (1982); since we had not completed our study of the case last Term, we ordered reargument, 463 U.S. 1226 (1983). We now reverse."

STEINBERG v. COLUMBIA PICTURES INDUSTRIES, INC., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). "Plaintiff alleges that defendants' promotional poster for the movie "Moscow" infringes his copyright on an illustration that he drew for The New Yorker and that appeared on the cover of the March 29, 1976 issue of the magazine, in violation of 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810. Defendants deny this allegation and assert the affirmative defenses of fair use as a parody, estoppel and laches. Defendants have moved, and plaintiff has cross-moved, for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, this court rejects defendants' asserted defenses and grants summary judgment on the issue of copying to plaintiff."

SUPERIOR FORM BLDRS. v. DAN CHASE TAXIDERMY, 74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996). "The principal issue presented in this appeal is whether animal mannequins used by taxidermists to mount animal skins are copyrightable. The controversy centers around whether these mannequins are "useful articles" or "sculptural works" within the meaning of the Copyright Act, and if useful, whether their sculptural features are conceptually separable and thus copyrightable." "Because these animal mannequins were designed to portray the appearance of animals through artistic features introduced by the author in their creation, we hold that they are not "useful articles" as defined in the Copyright Act and that therefore copyright protection is available for them. Because we also reject the assignments of error attributed to the evidentiary and damage rulings, we affirm."

TASINI v. THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY, INC., 206 F.3d 161 (2nd Cir. 2000). "Six freelance writers appeal from a grant of summary judgment dismissing their complaint. The complaint alleged that appellees had infringed appellants' various copyrights by putting individual articles previously published in periodicals on electronic databases available to the public. On cross motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that appellees' use of the articles was protected by the "privilege" afforded to publishers of "collective works" under Section 201(c) of the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Act" or "1976 Act"), 17 U.S.C. § 201(c). We reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment for appellants."

TELEPROMPTER CORP. v. COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). "The plaintiffs in this litigation, creators and producers of televised programs copyrighted under the provisions of the Copyright Act of 1909, as amended, 17 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., commenced suit in 1964 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that the defendants had infringed their copyrights by intercepting broadcast transmissions of copyrighted material and rechanneling these programs through various community antenna television (CATV) systems to paying subscribers." "In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390., decided in 1968, we held that the reception and distribution of television broadcastsby the CATV systems there involved did not constitute a "performance" within the meaning of the Copyright Act, and thus did not amount to copyright infringement." "Both the plaintiffs and the defendants petitioned for certiorari, we granted both petitions."

TIME INC. v. BERNARD GEIS ASSOCS., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). "This is a motion by plaintiff for summary judgment "interlocutory in character" on the issue of liability alone, as authorized by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." "Life [TIME INC.] states that the only issue to be tried is that of damages." "The conclusion is that there must be summary judgment for defendants." "In determining the issue of fair use, the balance seems to be in favor of defendants." "Plaintiff has no cause of action under the State law for unfair competition. The parties are not in competition and it has been found that the copying by defendants was fair and reasonable." "The motion of plaintiff is denied."

TRANSWESTERN PUB. v. MULTIMEDIA MKTG. ASSOC., 133 F.3d 773 (10th Cir. 1998). "The case stems from defendants' publication of a combined white and yellow pages telephone directory containing advertisements resembling those in plaintiff's directory. The appeal requires us to consider the law enunciated in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), involving white pages factual information, in the context of directories containing yellow pages advertising." "In this case, under Section(s) 404(a) the notice protecting the overall collective work does not extend to the ads in question. As plaintiff has failed to present evidence of its original contributions to the advertisements in question, the ads are not protectible even without the mandatory notice requirement."

VEECK v. SOUTHERN BUILDING CODE CONGRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002). "The issue in this en banc case is the extent to which a private organization may assert copyright protection for its model codes, after the models have been adopted by a legislative body and become "the law". Specifically, may a code-writing organization prevent a website operator from posting the text of a model code where the code is identified simply as the building code of a city that enacted the model code as law? Our short answer is that as law, the model codes enter the public domain and are not subject to the copyright holder's exclusive prerogatives. As model codes, however, the organization's works retain their protected status." "We REVERSE the district court's judgment against Peter Veeck, and REMAND with instructions to dismiss SBCCI's claims."

WALTHAL v. RUSK, 172 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999). "What we have here is simply an oral licensing agreement between the parties that had no specified duration; it did not set out any circumstances giving rise to a right of termination." "The district court granted a summary judgment motion filed by the Butthole Surfers on the pivotal issue in the case - whether 17 U.S.C. § 203 prohibits the termination of the agreement. The court determined that the Butthole Surfers' termination of the licensing agreement was effective and, accordingly, infringement by the defendants was found." "We conclude that allowing terminations under Illinois law does not conflict with § 203, but rather is, in fact, in keeping with the intent of § 203. Therefore, there is no issue of preemption. Under Illinois law, this contract can be terminated, and it is undisputed that the Butthole Surfers' letter of December 8, 1995, did just that. That letter rendered the license agreement kaput." The decision of the district court is. AFFIRMED.

WARNER BROS. v. AM. BROADCASTING COMPANIES, 720 F.2d 231 (2nd Cir. 1983). "The primary issue raised by this appeal is whether as a matter of law the fictional character Ralph Hinkley, the principal figure in a television series, "The Greatest American Hero," is not sufficiently similar to the fictional character Superman, the hero of comic books, television, and more recently films, so that claims of copyright infringement and unfair competition may be dismissed without consideration by a jury. The appeal is from a January 22, 1982, judgment of the District Court for the Southern District of New York (Constance Baker Motley, Chief Judge) dismissing claims of plaintiffs Warner Bros., Inc., Film Export, A.G., and DC Comics, Inc. against defendant American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC) and third-party defendant Stephen J. Cannell Productions upon the granting of defendants' motion for summary judgment." The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

WARREN PUB., INC., v. MICRODOS DATA CORP., 115 F.3d 1509 (11th Cir. 1997). "This is an appeal from the district court's entry of a preliminary injunction enjoining a putative infringer from infringing the compilation copyright of a publisher of a cable television factbook. As a predicate for the injunction, the district court granted partial summary judgment for the copyright holder, finding that the copyright holder's system of selecting the names of communities under which to list the data in its factbook was sufficiently creative and original to warrant copyright protection. Based on Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991), as well as our application of Feist in BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1101, 114 S.Ct. 943, 127 L.Ed.2d 232 (1994), we VACATE the injunction and REMAND for further proceedings."

WEST PUBLISHING CO. v. ON POINT SOLUTIONS, INC., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20040; 1994 WL 778426 (N.D. Ga. 1994). "Plaintiff West Publishing Company (West), among its other businesses, compiles and publishes annotated case reports of the decisions of the Florida Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court in a publication entitled Southern Reporter(R)." "Defendant On Point Solutions, Inc. has created and is marketing and licensing a product known as "On Point Solutions' Florida CD-ROM" (the "On Point Disc"). The On Point Disc consists of a computerized database on a CD-ROM, which includes unannotated case reports of the Florida Courts of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court." "Defendant On Point Solutions, Inc., together with its officers, agents, employees, principals, owners, directors, shareholders, affiliated companies and attorneys, and all other persons, firms or companies permanently enjoined..

WILDLIFE EXPRESS CORP. v. CAROL WRIGHT SALES, INC., 18 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 1994). "Wildlife Express Corporation ("Wildlife") brought an action against Carol Wright Sales, Inc. ("Carol Wright") to recover damages for infringement of various copyrighted animal-styled children's duffle bags. The magistrate judge, sitting with the consent of the parties as the district court, found that Carol Wright had infringed, willfully or with reckless disregard, Wildlife's copyrights of the sculptured bear, duck and elephant duffle bags and awarded statutory damages in the amount of $50,000 per copyright infringement. Carol Wright appeals." "We affirm the judgment of the district court."

WRENCH LLC. v. TACO BELL CORP., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001). "This case raises a question of first impression in this circuit regarding the extent to which the Copyright Act preempts state law claims based on breach of an implied-in-fact contract. Plaintiffs-Appellants Wrench LLC, Joseph Shields, and Thomas Rinks brought this diversity action against Defendant-Appellee Taco Bell Corporation ("Taco Bell"), claiming breach of implied contract and various torts related to Taco Bell's alleged use of appellants' ideas." "The district court granted summary judgment to Taco Bell." "Appellants now appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment, and argue the following: (1) that the district court erred in its preemption analysis under both the "subject matter" and "equivalency" prongs of 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); and, (2) that the district court erred in holding that novelty was required to sustain their implied-in-fact contract claim." "The judgment of the district court is REVERSED"

XOOM, INC. v. IMAGELINE, INC., 323 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2003). "Xoom, Inc. filed suit in federal district court against Imageline, Inc., seeking relief under federal and state law for alleged violations of the Copyright Act of 1976 and interference with contractual rights. In response, Imageline filed a counterclaim alleging copyright infringement, false advertising, unfair competition, and business conspiracy. Subsequently, Xoom filed motions for partial summary judgment and summary judgment, which the district court granted. Imageline appealed to this Court." ""preexisting materials may be subject to copyright protection under the umbrella of a compilation copyright."). We adopt this view and reverse the district court, finding that because Imageline owned copyright in SuperBundle and Master Gallery and in the underlying works of each, its registration of Super- Bundle and Master Gallery was sufficient to permit an infringement action on the underlying parts, whether they be new or preexisting."

YANKEE CANDLE CO. v. THE BRIDGEWATER CANDLE CO., 259 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001). "Yankee Candle Company ("Yankee"), a leading manufacturer of scented candles, sued competitor Bridgewater Candle Company ("Bridgewater") on counts of copyright infringement and trade dress infringement under federal law, as well as on state claims of common law trade dress infringement, tortious interference, and deceptive trade practices under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A." "On appeal, Yankee challenges: (i) the grant of summary judgment on its copyright claims; (ii) the grant of summary judgment on its federal trade dress claims; (iii) the district court's decision to narrow the scope of trial and severely limit allowable evidence; and (iv) the grant of summary judgment on the 93A claim. We affirm the opinions of the district court."